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JANUARY-FEBRUARY, 1958
ONE YEAR REVIEW OF EVIDENCE
By RONALD V. YEGGE
Member of the Denver firm
Yegge, Bates, Hall and Shulenburg
Below are briefed the 1957 Colorado decisions touching on evidence.
They are topically presented for convenient reference. The topics are
organizational and should not be considered conclusive.
ADMISSIONS
Ankcorn v. Boulder County Welfare Dep't' was an action by the
county welfare department to recover, from the personal representative
of a deceased old age pensioner, pension payments which the department
alleged the decedent was not entitled to because she owned certain
bonds. The defendant during the life time of the old age pensioner had
filed a suit as her conservatrix and in that suit alleged in the complaint
that the old age pensioner owned the bonds. The court held that the
defendant's personal representative was bound by the facts she had
alleged in the complaint which she filed as conservatrix.
Miller v. Hepner2 was an action by Miller against A. J. Hepner,
his wife Lillian and a corporation on an agreement between the Hepners
and the plaintiff whereby A. J. Hepner was to pay certain amounts to
the plaintiff and to Lillian Hepner. When A. J. Hepner died, Lillian,
as executrix of his estate, was substituted for him as a defendant. The
trial court refused to admit the plaintiff's testimony as to conversations
between himself, A. J. and Lillian, holding that exception (6) of the
Dead Man's Statutela would not apply because Lillian as well as plain-
tiff had an interest in the enforcement of the agreement. The supreme
court held, however, that Lillian's interest was adverse to plaintiff's.
She was almost the sole beneficiary of A. J.'s estate and if plaintiff
recovered against the estate the loss to the estate was, in substance,
Lillian Hepner's loss.
In Foster v. Feder,3 a suit to recover compensation for services ren-
dered, the court held that the plaintiff's original complaint, which he
later amended materially, was admissible in evidence against him as an
admission against interest.
HEARSAY (INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION)
In Williams v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co.,4 a Workmen's Com-
pensation case, the validity of claimant-plaintiff's marriage to a deceased
employee was the issue. A statement written by one person and signed
by another person, neither of whom testified, reciting facts showing the
marriage was not valid, was admitted in evidence. The supreme court
said the statement was "purest hearsay," not made competent by the
statute which provides that the Commission and its referees "shall not
be bound by the usual common law or statutory rules of evidence ....
The court expressly disapproved its statements in several cases which
indicated that an award of the Industrial Commission could not be
reversed because of the introduction of hearsay evidence.
1 307 P.2d 1110 (Colo. 1957).
2 314 P.2d 604 (Colo. 1957).2 a Colo, Rev. Stat. Ann. § 153-1-2 (6) (1953).
3 316 P.2d 576 (Colo. 1957).
4 10 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 95 (1957).




The last reported case of the year touching on evidence is the case
of Alexander Film Co. v. Industrial Comm'n. The issue was whether
or not a deceased employee was in the course of his employment at the
time of the accident that caused his death. The deceased had told a
fellow employee shortly before the accident that he was returning to his
motel for the purpose of performing certain tasks for his employer.
When crossing the street to the motel he was struck by a motor vehicle
and was killed. The court held that the statement of the deceased just
prior to the accident was a statement of design or plan which was within
an exception of the hearsay rule and was admissible in evidence. The
court pointed out that where such a statement is attended by the ele-
ments of a present existing state of mind and is made in the usual course
of things under circumstances excluding an ulterior purpose, the admis-
sion into evidence of the statement is proper.
JUDICIAL NOTICE
In Union Pacific R.R. v. Cogburn,7 the court stated that: "It is
common knowledge, of which we take notice, that the point of inter-
section of a railroad and a highway is a point of danger.''8
In the case of Mosko v. Dunbar,9 the supreme court, in affirming
the lower court's determination of the constitutionality of a statute bar-
ring sale of motor vehicles on Sundays, judicial notice was taken that
it was common knowledge that the automobile business had expanded,
grown, and developed since a prior decision of the court in 1938.
OPINION
Davis v. Bonebrake"6 was a suit against a physician for alleged mal-
practice in leaving a surgical sponge in the plaintiff's body. A nurse
testified that he was present when an operation was performed on the
plaintiff in which a substance was removed from her body which in his
opinion was surgical gauze. The supreme court held this testimony was
admissible whether the witness was professionally qualified or not. The
expression of an opinion or an impression is admissible unless the opin-
ion is based on conjecture or hearsay. In the same case the court held
that evidence of two conversations between the plaintiff and the nurse
was admissible, not to prove the malpractice but to show when plaintiff
was first informed of the fact on which she based her case, the plaintiff
having alleged that the defendant had fraudulently concealed the facts
so that the statute of limitations had not run.
In the case of City of Boulder v. Burns," a case wherein the plain-
tiff sought damages as a result of stumbling over a water box owned by
the defendant, it was held that the decision of the trial judge on the
qualifications of a witness called to give opinion evidence is conclusive
unless clearly shown to be erroneous in matter of law.
PAROL EVIDENCE
In Payne v. Cummings,12 the court reiterated the general rule that
recission of a written contract by mutual consent of the parties to the
contract may be established by parol evidence.
6 Decided December 23, 1957.
7 315 P.2d 209 (Colo. 1957).
s Id. at 212.
9 309 P.2d 581 (Colo. 1957).
10 313 P.2d 982 (Colo. 1957).
11 312 P.2d 712 (Colo. 1957).




In the case of People v. Scott,'1 in which a quo warranto proceeding
was involved, the court held that there is a strong presumption, par-
ticularly applicable to executive actions by the governor of the state,
that every public officer does his duty and that executive action may be
questioned or controlled by the courts only when such action is minis-
terial, and requires the exercise of neither judgment nor discretion.
In the case of Industrial Comm'n v. London & Lancashire Indem-
nity Co., 4 it was held in a Workmen's Compensation case that it was
not necessary to overcome the presumption against suicide by conclusive
evidence and further held that the burden of proof remained upon the
claimant to establish that the injury or death was not intentionally self-
inflicted. Where evidence was offered by the employer from which the
conclusion of suicide could be reached, the inference against self-destruc-
tion was insufficient basis for an award in favor of the claimant.
Comment was made in Williams v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 5
that proof of a marriage ceremony and cohabitation until the death of
one raises a presumption of the validity of the marriage which the party
attacking it must overcome by competent evidence.
PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE
Industrial Comm'n v. Havens,16 involved a claim of coronary occlu-
sion and death caused by an accident in the course of employment. No
medical testimony was taken. The death certificate stating "coronary
occlusion" as the cause of death was admitted in evidence. The supreme
court held that the coronary occlusion was prima facie proved by the
admission in evidence of the death certificate; that causal connection
between the employee's over-exertion and death need not be proved by
expert medical testimony; that the claimant was not required to prove
by direct and conclusive evidence the cause of death as arising out of
employment and that the claimant had made a prima facie case by show-
ing circumstances establishing a reasonable connection between the over-
exertion and the death, which was not refuted.
RECORDS
Mumm v. Adam, 7 was a suit to recover on a note and a check. The
defendant filed a counter-claim alleging that the plaintiff, his former
13 134 Colo. 525, 307 P.2d 191 (1957).
14 311 P.2d 705 (Colo. 1957).
15 10 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 95 (1957).
16 314 P.2d 698 (Colo. 1957).
17 134 Colo. 493, 307 P.2d 797 (1957).
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partner, had failed to account for profits in the partnership. The books
and records of the partnership were put in evidence. The defendant
offered in evidence the income tax returns of the partnership for three
years. The plaintiff objected to their admission because they "might be
used for the confusion of the jury,''18 because they did not prove any-
thing the defendant was obliged to prove, and because the original books
and records were the best evidence. The court held, however, that the
income tax returns were admissible because they sumnmarized the entries
in the books, because they would aid the jury in determining the differ-
ence between the total of sales shown in the books and the total of sales
revealed by sales sheets, and because of the inference that could be
drawn from the evidence that the parties recognized them as periodic
accountings between themselves.
In the case of Buchholz v. Union Pacific R.R.,' it was held unneces-
sary for the railroad, in proving a cross-claim for damages resulting from
an auto-train collision, to produce original entries of each transaction
concerned in damage to the railroad, the court stating that it was prob-
ably impossible to have each of the entries identified by the person who
originally made them. It was further held that the sworn testimony of
a proper supervisor to the effect that certain facts were shown by the
corporate records over which he had supervision was competent evi-
dence. Referring to Rule 43 (f) of the Colorado Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, the court held that where the original records are complicated,
burdensome, or voluminous, summaries of such original records, pre-
pared by competent persons, may be offered in evidence as the only
practicable way of receiving such proof.
It will be observed that in this review no comment is made relative
to criminal cases. A review of criminal cases is being reported elsewhere
in this issue. In the interest of space and to avoid duplication, such
cases are not here covered.
STATUTES
The legislature in House Bill No. 13320 provided that in a paternity
suit upon motion of the reputed father, the court shall order the mother
and child to submit to one or more blood grouping tests to determine
whether or not the reputed father can be excluded as being the father
of a child or children and the results of such tests may be received in
evidence, but only in such cases where exclusion is established.
In House Bill No. 25821 the General Assembly amended §152-5-31 of
the 1953 Revised Statutes relative to the taking of a deposition of a
witness to a will. This amendment specifically provides that a photo-
static or photographic copy of the will be attached to the Commission
and the original will shall be retained by the court.
House Bill No. 27522 amended the Uniform Photographic Records
Act enacted in 1955 to provide that the records of the trust department
of a bank or trust company are not such records as are excepted under
the phrase in the original act as being "held in a custodial or fiduciary
capacity" and that such trust records could be reproduced and the
destroying of the original records would not effect the admissibility of
the reproduction into evidence.
18 Id. at 500. 307 P.2d at 801.
10 311 P.2d 717 (Colo. 1957).
20 Colo. Laws 1st Reg. Sess. 1957, c. 139.
21 Colo. Laws 1st Reg. Sess. 1957, c. 297.
22 Colo. Laws 1st Reg. Sess. 1957, c. 140.
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